Many analysts argue that the nuclear renaissance could lead to the international spread of nuclear weapons.
i While there are considerable distinctions among the arguments made by these authors, the essential logic linking the nuclear renaissance to nuclear weapons proliferation is fairly straightforward.
ii If the international demand for nuclear energy remains high, countries with nuclear energy programs will need access to nuclear fuel (Gourley and Stulberg this issue).
While countries can receive nuclear fuel-cycle services from other states, those with strong interests in nuclear energy may prefer to produce nuclear fuel domestically in order to insulate themselves from the vagaries of strategic bargaining and the international market (Stulberg this issue). Most of the countries interested in producing nuclear fuel domestically will not be able to develop these sophisticated nuclear technologies indigenously and will, therefore, need to acquire assistance from other more advanced nuclear suppliers. Because the existing nuclear suppliers have strong economic incentives to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology, these states should be able to secure international help (e.g., Potter 1982, Braun and Chyba 2004) . Finally, after having acquired sensitive dual-use nuclear technologies --such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies that can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants, or nuclear weapons, or both --many countries might eventually opt to build nuclear weapons arsenals (e.g., Sagan and Miller 2009, 13) . In short, the nuclear renaissance could lead to nuclear proliferation.
In this chapter, I argue that the argument about a link between the nuclear renaissance and widespread nuclear weapons proliferation is misguided. While many countries might want sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities, few will be able to acquire them. Nuclear suppliers are unwilling to transfer sensitive nuclear technologies to any country willing to pay the price.
Rather, they are most likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under relatively rare strategic conditions (Kroenig 2009a (Kroenig , 2010 . While a small number of countries might receive sensitive nuclear help, the vast majority of states will be unlikely to secure an international supplier.
Without access to nuclear fuel-cycle facilities, countries --even those that badly want to join the nuclear club --will not be able to build nuclear weapons.
Although this chapter argues that the nuclear renaissance is unlikely to result in a proliferation cascade, this chapter in no way seeks to minimize the threat of nuclear proliferation.
The spread of nuclear weapons remains one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security. At the time of writing in 2012, Iran's nuclear program continued to advance and U.S. government officials speculated that nuclear weapons in Iran could have grave consequences for U.S.
national security, including: enhancing Iranian hegemonic ambitions; providing a cover under which Tehran can step up support for proxy groups or to engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy; encouraging other states in the Middle East to go nuclear and weakening the global nonproliferation regime; and, most worryingly, triggering possible nuclear war between Iran and Israel, or Iran and the United States. Even a single instance of nuclear proliferation, therefore, provides a significant cause of concern. It is indeed possible that over the course of the coming decades a renaissance in nuclear energy could result in a small number of additional countries joining the nuclear club. This chapter, therefore, does not imply that we should not be worried about these cases. Rather, the argument here is that, even in the midst of a global nuclear renaissance, the forces that moderate the behavior of the nuclear suppliers will provide a check against the widespread diffusion of nuclear weapons.
The rest of the chapter elaborates on this argument in five parts. First, I review the logic linking the nuclear renaissance to the diffusion of sensitive fuel-cycle technologies and eventually to nuclear weapons proliferation. Next, I review the evidence supporting the argument that strategic conditions heavily condition the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. Third, I apply these findings to the question of whether the nuclear renaissance will result in nuclear proliferation. Finally, I conclude with a recap of the argument and discuss the implications for policymakers interested in stemming the spread of nuclear weapons.
The Nuclear Renaissance and Nuclear Proliferation
The idea that the nuclear renaissance will result in widespread nuclear weapons proliferation rests on four propositions. This section adumbrates each of these propositions in turn.
1. The nuclear renaissance will result in an increased demand for nuclear fuel. If the nuclear renaissance comes to fruition and many more countries around the world possess nuclear power programs, and the existing countries with nuclear energy programs increase their share of domestic energy provided by nuclear power, then there will be an increased demand for nuclear fuel. The logic is simple: more countries operating more nuclear power reactors will result in a greater need for nuclear fuel.
The production of nuclear fuel requires a series of technically sophisticated steps.
Enriched-uranium fuel is the result of a process that begins by mining natural uranium, milling the natural uranium into a dry powder known as "yellowcake," converting the powder into uranium hexafluoride gas, enriching the uranium --separating the nonfissionable U-238 isotopes of uranium from the fissionable U-235 isotopes --then finally fabricating the enriched uranium into solid metal pellets that are packed into metal nuclear fuel rods.
Plutonium can also be used as a nuclear fuel. PU-239 is a byproduct of a nuclear reaction. Spent fuel rods, therefore, that have passed through a nuclear reactor contain some plutonium. The plutonium can be separated from the other elements of the spent fuel using a chemical process and then converted into plutonium fuel rods.
In order to acquire nuclear fuel made from either uranium or plutonium, countries have two broad options. They can operate nuclear fuel-cycle facilities domestically --either uranium enrichment, or plutonium reprocessing, or both --and produce their own nuclear fuel.
Alternatively, if they lack domestic fuel-cycle capabilities, they can have another country or international body provide them with fuel services. Nuclear fuel providers, such as France and Russia, ship recipient countries nuclear fuel for use in nuclear power reactors and then reclaim the spent fuel for reprocessing or storage. By contracting for nuclear fuel services, countries can enjoy the benefits of a nuclear power program without developing, maintaining, and operating their own domestic fuel-cycle capabilities. There are costs, however, to being dependent on the international market for nuclear fuel.
2. Countries will prefer to possess the ability to produce nuclear fuel indigenously, rather than be vulnerable to international fuel supplies. Many analysts argue that countries will tend to prefer to produce fuel indigenously for two reasons. First, countries would like to produce nuclear fuel themselves for reasons of energy security (Stulberg this volume). Relying on international suppliers to meet their core energy needs leaves countries vulnerable. A halt in the shipment of much-needed nuclear fuel due to changing economic and political incentives in the nuclear suppliers could cripple a country's economy. As Stulberg points out, policymakers and analysts recognize this problem and are attempting to devise means to guarantee countries access to international nuclear fuel supplies through international nuclear fuel banks and fuel assurances. As Stulberg also notes, however, there are inherent challenges to making these promises credible. Indeed, on a few occasions in the past, countries have had their nuclear fuel supplies threatened and many aspiring nuclear nations are skeptical that promises of international nuclear aid will be consistently kept.
Second, some countries might seek to develop a domestic fuel-cycle capability as a security strategy to hedge against an uncertain future. Nuclear fuel-cycle facilities can be used to produce nuclear fuel for reactors or for nuclear weapons. willing to transfer sensitive nuclear technologies. According to this line of thought, the nuclear renaissance will lead to a significant increase in the number of countries with a fully-developed nuclear-fuel cycle.
4.
Countries that receive sensitive nuclear assistance will be able to produce nuclear weapons. The international spread of nuclear facilities could lead to many potential security challenges, including concerns about nuclear safety, sabotage of nuclear facilities, terrorist theft of nuclear materials, nuclear weapons proliferation, and destruction of nuclear facilities in a conventional war (Miller and Sagan 2010, 126) . This chapter focuses on nuclear weapons proliferation.
As more countries acquire sensitive fuel-cycle facilities, more countries will have the ability to produce nuclear weapons. The most difficult part of building a nuclear weapon is producing the weapons-grade fissile material (either highly-enriched uranium, or separated plutonium) that forms the core of the nuclear device. Sensitive nuclear technologies, uraniumenrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies in particular, are dual-use technologies that can be used to produce nuclear fuel for use either in nuclear power reactors or nuclear weapons.
In fact, once countries have mastered the ability to produce nuclear fuel, some analysts argue that they are no more than a few screw-driver turns away from possessing nuclear weapons. As
Mohamed El-Baradei (2003), the Director General of the IAEA averred, "should a state with a fully-developed fuel-cycle capability decide, for whatever reason, to break away from its nonproliferation commitments, most experts believe it could produce a nuclear weapon within a matter of months." Similarly, Scott Sagan and Steven Miller (2009, 13) write, "Indeed, the connection between power and weapons is somewhat inevitable because key technologies in the nuclear sector--notably, uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities--are relevant to both."
Countries that possess fuel-cycle technologies, therefore, exist in a state of "nuclear latency" (Sagan 2010). In other words, they have the ability to produce nuclear weapons in short order if they chose to do so. While many countries might remain latent nuclear powers for an extended period of time, the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies greatly increases the risk that additional countries will eventually engage in overt nuclear proliferation. Again, according
to Sagan and Miller (2009, 13) , depending on which "capabilities spread to which states, especially regarding uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, a world of widely spread nuclear technologies could be…a world where more states possess nuclear weapons." Indeed, as I have shown in previous research, states that receive sensitive nuclear assistance from more advanced nuclear suppliers are five and a half times more likely to acquire nuclear weapons than similar states that do not get outside help (Kroenig 2010, 171 ).
This chapter focuses on sensitive nuclear technologies because there is a widespread scientific and policy consensus that there is a direct link between the possession of sensitive, fuel-cycle technologies and the ability to produce nuclear weapons. On the other hand, other less sensitive types of nuclear technology, such as light-water nuclear power reactors, are more proliferation resistant. Matthew Fuhrmann (2009) proposes that all nuclear transfers, regardless of their level of sensitivity, contribute to proliferation, but these claims are based on an analysis of nuclear cooperation agreements (many of which are subsequently canceled), not on actual nuclear transfers. Using data on transfers of nuclear technology that have actually occurred, I
show instead that there is not a statistical link between the receipt of civilian nuclear assistance and the probability that a country subsequently goes nuclear (Kroenig 2010, 159-169) . The reason is simple: while some recipients of civilian nuclear assistance, such as India, went on to build the bomb, many more, including Australia, Belgium, Egypt, Finland, Peru, Vietnam, and others, have not.
iii A consideration of less sensitive nuclear technologies and the nuclear renaissance can be found elsewhere in this volume (Fuhrmann, this volume).
In sum, the four propositions above combine to suggest that the nuclear renaissance will lead to a significant increase in the number of countries with a fully-developed nuclear-fuel cycle and, in turn, to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. iv The underlying logic of this argument is sound, but not all of the key propositions on which the argument rests stand up to empirical scrutiny. In a previous chapter, Stulberg questioned whether countries will prefer to produce nuclear fuel domestically and identified conditions under which the international community can provide credible fuel assurances that are likely to convince future nuclear power states to accept international fuel-supply arrangements. Alexander Montgomery (this volume) challenges the evidence underlying the belief that sensitive nuclear assistance causes nuclear proliferation. The remainder of this chapter, in contrast, will present evidence that undermines proposition three.
Countries interested in developing a domestic nuclear fuel cycle capability will struggle to find an international supplier. Sensitive nuclear materials and technologies are not freely available on the international nuclear marketplace. Nuclear suppliers are quite selective in the provision of sensitive nuclear assistance and this greatly complicates state efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear technology. As we will see in the next section, states are most likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance and technology only under relatively rare strategic conditions.
The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Assistance
In Fourth, I show that strategy, not economics, largely determines countries' willingness to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology. Nuclear suppliers are most likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance when doing so would threaten an enemy, but not threaten themselves. When is a country most threatened by nuclear proliferation? I argue that the spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states. This is because nuclear weapons proliferation constrains the military freedom of action of powerful states.
Powerful states can threaten or promise to protect other states. But when other states acquire nuclear weapons, these threats to do harm, or promises to provide protection, lose their credibility. This fact leads to three strategic conditions under which states are most likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. First, the less powerful a state is relative to a potential nuclear recipient, the more likely it is to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to that state. The logic is simple. States avoid constraining their own military freedom of action. Second, states are most likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to states with which they share a common enemy. By providing nuclear assistance to these states, they can impose strategic constraints on other, more powerful rivals. Third, states that depend on superpower protection to provide for their own security are unlikely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. These states judge that the costs of antagonizing a superpower patron outweigh any benefits of participating in sensitive nuclear transactions.
The strategic conditions that facilitate sensitive nuclear transfers can be illustrated by the case of Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan (Kroenig 2010, 112-120) . From 1981 to 1986, China helped Pakistan construct and operate uranium enrichment facilities, transferred enough highly enriched uranium for two nuclear weapons, and shared a nuclear bomb design. Due to geographic constraints and a lack of airlift and amphibious invasion capabilities, China lacked the ability to project power over Pakistan, meaning that its own military freedom of action would not be constrained if Pakistan acquired the bomb. In addition, by providing nuclear assistance to Pakistan, China could impose strategic costs on its longtime regional rival, India, a country that had the ability to project power against Pakistan. Finally, as a nuclear weapon state, China enjoyed a measure of security independence and did not need to worry that sensitive nuclear exports would hurt its relationship with a superpower security provider.
In this volume, Gartkze suggests additional motives for sensitive nuclear transfers. He claims that states will be more willing to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to states that are likely to acquire nuclear weapons anyway, regardless of whether they get help. In this way, the supplier can garner some influence over the recipient without significantly contributing to proliferation. In addition, Gartzke suggests that nonnuclear weapon states with advanced nuclear technology will be more likely than nuclear weapon states to provide sensitive nuclear assistance, because nuclear weapon states have an incentive to limit the size of the nuclear club.
His conjectures are plausible, but the empirical record demonstrates that they are incorrect. A careful look at the most important cases of sensitive nuclear assistance does not turn up a single instance of a policymaker choosing to provide nuclear assistance because he or she believed the recipient was bound to proliferate anyway. In fact, leaders often provide nuclear assistance because they believe that the recipient would not be able to proliferate without their help. As (Kroenig 2010, 5, 178) . This is because nuclear-armed states enjoy a degree of security independence and need to worry less about incurring the wrath of the international community.
Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and the Nuclear Renaissance
The above analysis of historical patterns of sensitive nuclear assistance has important implications for our current attempts to understand the nuclear renaissance. Of course, one should be cautious about blindly extrapolating historical trends into the future. It is always possible that a radical discontinuity could emerge, creating a future that will be utterly unrecognizable from our current temporal perch. As the Danish physicist Neils Bohr is reported to have said, "Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." Nevertheless, past is often prologue and much of social science is based on the idea that historical data can help us better understand the workings of enduring social phenomena. In addition to conjectures by informed analysts therefore, the findings of careful social science research can provide a valuable tool in helping us to forecast the possible proliferation consequences of the nuclear renaissance.
This research demonstrates that the idea that so-called "proliferation rings" are an important driving force for future nuclear proliferation exists more in the imagination of analysts than in reality. The sub-state smuggling of significant quantities of sensitive nuclear materials and technology has been virtually nonexistent in the past. It is unlikely, therefore, that countries will be able to produce functioning nuclear fuel-cycle facilities with help from non-state actors.
Some may object that while sub-state proliferation rings leading to significant nuclear transfers have been rare historically, they could become more common in the future due to globalization, the diffusion of nuclear know-how, and worldwide reductions in technological barriers to entry in the nuclear field. There are, however, reasons to be skeptical of this claim. Governments have strong political, economic, and strategic incentives to maintain tight control over their most sensitive nuclear technologies. This has been true in the past and it will likely remain so in the future. Granted, some key component parts for the uranium enrichment facilities exported by A.Q. Khan's Pakistan were produced by private firms in Malaysia, Switzerland, and South Africa. But these actors could not have been important nodes in a global nonproliferation network had it not been for strong state support on both the recipient and supplier side of the transactions. As was pointed out above, A.Q. Khan's nuclear supply network was supported by the Pakistani state through and through. And the recipients, Iran, Libya, and North Korea, were eager to receive sensitive nuclear help. Experience suggests, therefore, that we should be much more concerned about the state-sponsored transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technology, not sub-state "proliferation rings."
We also saw above, however, that state-sponsored transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technology also has been exceedingly rare. It is unlikely, therefore, that any particular new nuclear power state will receive sensitive nuclear assistance from other states. Since 1945, there have only been fourteen instances of sensitive nuclear assistance. Moreover, some of these transfers were to the same recipient state. Since 1945, only twelve countries have been fortunate enough to receive sensitive nuclear assistance from a more advanced nuclear supplier state.
Many others have tried to obtain such assistance and failed. For example, while exploring the nuclear option in the 1960s, Egypt requested sensitive nuclear assistance from France, the Soviet Union, and China, only to be rebuffed each time. There is good reason to believe, therefore, that countries seeking sensitive nuclear assistance today will also encounter great difficulties.
While future sensitive nuclear transfers are unlikely, the above analysis suggests the conditions under which they will be most likely to occur. Despite a conventional wisdom to the contrary, states do not provide sensitive nuclear assistance for economic reasons. Capable nuclear suppliers experiencing economic underdevelopment or slow or negative growth rates are not more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology than their wealthier counterparts. One would be ill advised, therefore, to make predictions about the future of the nuclear renaissance by identifying relationships between economically desperate nuclear suppliers, like North Korea, and deep-pocketed aspirants, such as Saudi Arabia.
Rather, sensitive nuclear transfers are driven by a strategic logic. If we seek to identify whether the nuclear renaissance will lead to nuclear weapons proliferation and which countries will be most likely to acquire nuclear weapons in a future nuclear renaissance, we must focus on these strategic conditions. The nuclear supplier-nuclear recipient dyads that could engage in sensitive nuclear cooperation are those in which: the former lacks the ability to project military power over the latter, the states possess a common enemy, and neither state depends on the United States to provide for its core security needs.
Focusing on the last condition first, it is evident that many capable nuclear suppliers are protected by the U.S. security umbrella and will therefore be unlikely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. These countries will prefer to avoid jeopardizing an important security relationship by antagonizing Washington on this important political issue. with the United States. The remaining countries, therefore, are the nuclear suppliers of special concern. In other words, there are only eight countries in the world today that are at a heightened risk of providing sensitive nuclear assistance.
-Insert Table 8 -1 hereMoreover, there are additional strategic factors that will shape how these countries view the attractiveness of nuclear exports. Returning to the first strategic condition shaping nuclear assistance, we can infer that these eight nuclear suppliers will be unlikely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to countries against which they can project military power; they will prefer to avoid constraining their own military freedom of action. This consideration limits the pool of potential nuclear suppliers for would-be proliferators even further. China, for example, will be unlikely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to other states in Asia because it will desire to maintain its military predominance in this region. Similarly, Iran will be reluctant to export sensitive nuclear materials to other actors in the Middle East. Any country seeking to acquire sensitive nuclear materials and technology, therefore, will generally be forced to search for one of a handful of capable nuclear suppliers beyond its own geographic region.
Finally, we turn to the second condition. Taking this condition seriously suggests that future sensitive nuclear transfers will most likely occur between nuclear suppliers and nuclear recipients that share a common enemy. In these situations, nuclear suppliers could provide nuclear assistance in order to constrain a powerful rival. Considering the remaining pool of supplier states, we can identify only a small number of supplier-recipient dyads that meet this improves North Korea's relative standing because: "Once the U.S. is not able to be predominant over others, then we can be on equal footing." Given the continued animosity between
Washington and Pyongyang there is little reason to believe that North Korea's nuclear generosity to America's rivals will end anytime soon. Indeed, the North Korean official threatened that Pyongyang will continue "to sell our nuclear arms to countries which hate the U.S."
India is also a country at risk of exporting sensitive nuclear materials and technology.
Given its historical rivalry with China, India could conceivably provide sensitive nuclear assistance to small sates on China In sum, given our understanding of why states have provided sensitive nuclear assistance, there is good reason to believe that the international transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technology will remain uncommon. There are only a handful of nuclear supplier-nuclear recipient dyads for which the conditions that encourage sensitive nuclear transfers are currently in place. Over the next couple of decades, therefore, it is reasonable to expect that there might be a few --but only a few --instances in which capable nuclear suppliers might provide sensitive nuclear assistances to nonnuclear weapon states. In other words, this analysis strongly suggests that predictions that the nuclear renaissance will lead to the widespread diffusion of sensitive nuclear materials and technology that in turn results in a cascade of nuclear weapons proliferation are likely exaggerated.
Conclusion
This chapter examined whether the nuclear renaissance will result in the international spread of nuclear weapons. I claimed that the idea that the nuclear renaissance will fuel future nuclear proliferation rests on four propositions: that the nuclear renaissance will lead to an increased demand for nuclear fuel; that countries will prefer to possess domestic nuclear fuelcycle facilities, rather than receive international fuel services; that countries will be able to acquire sensitive nuclear assistance from other states; and that once countries receive sensitive nuclear assistance, they will be more likely to produce nuclear weapons.
In contrast, I argued that the nuclear renaissance is unlikely to result in nuclear weapons proliferation because the third of these four propositions is not true. Acquiring sensitive nuclear assistance and technology is quite difficult. Drawing on my own previous analysis of the causes of sensitive nuclear assistance, I demonstrated that the international transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technology is uncommon and is most likely to occur only under relatively rare strategic conditions. For this reason, countries --even countries that badly want to build domestic fuel-cycle facilities --will struggle to identify a willing foreign supplier. And, without international aid, countries will be less able to produce nuclear weapons.
When combined with the other chapters in this volume, the findings of this analysis give us further reason to doubt the conventional wisdom about a direct renaissance-proliferation link.
Four assumptions underlie this proposition, but the chapters of this volume suggest that at least three of these four assumptions are problematic. Stulberg (this volume) argues that it might be possible to design a system that provides a credible commitment to recipients of nuclear fuel cycle services. If Stulberg is correct, many future nuclear power states will be willing to accept international fuel supplies and will forgo the construction of domestic fuel-cycle facilities. I demonstrated that the countries that do decide to build domestic fuel-cycle facilities will be unlikely to succeed because they will struggle to secure international help. And finally, Montgomery (this volume) claims that even if countries receive sensitive nuclear assistance, they will be unable to construct nuclear weapons because, for a variety of reasons, international nuclear aid might actually impede a country's nuclear development. I have good reason to be skeptical of these claims. In previous research (Kroenig 2009b (Kroenig , 2010 , I have systematically demonstrated that countries that receive sensitive nuclear assistance are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Montgomery's chapter makes some thought-provoking claims that give us reason to suspect that sensitive nuclear assistance might provide a bigger boost to nuclear programs in certain types of recipient states than in others.
In March 2011, an earthquake and tsunami triggered a nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. This unexpected disaster might influence the development of the nuclear renaissance, as other authors in this volume point out, but it does not greatly affect our expectations about future patterns of sensitive nuclear transfers. Nuclear reactors produce sustained nuclear chain reactions that can generate tremendous power, but they can also result in devastating accidents. For this reason, nuclear reactors have been the incubators of history's worst nuclear disasters, including Fukushima. In addition, the spent fuel rods at Fukushima underwent a partial meltdown when the water levels in the spent fuel pools dropped. This has led to calls for more plutonium reprocessing which could reduce the density of spent fuel rods left cooling in pools and, in turn, the risk of meltdown. While the Fukushima nuclear accident, therefore, could dampen leaders' willingness to build nuclear reactors in their own countries and could increase the demand for reprocessing capabilities in countries currently operating reactors, my analysis of the causes of sensitive nuclear assistance gives us little reason to believe that these considerations will greatly affect the calculations of the potential suppliers to export fuel-cycle technologies.
This chapter not only drew lessons from past cases of nuclear assistance, but it also identified a small number of cases in which future nuclear transfers could occur. Of particular concern are the small number of capable nuclear suppliers that do not enjoy a close strategic relationship with the United States and that could conceivably benefit from additional constraints on American military power. China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea are at the top of the list of nuclear suppliers that might make such a strategic calculation. The respective leaderships might be tempted to export the bomb to some of Washington's enemies interested in developing nuclear programs, including Bolivia, Burma, Syria, or Venezuela. Intelligence analysts and policymakers must closely watch these countries for signs of fledgling nuclear relationships and adopt measures now to prevent sensitive transfers before they occur.
There are a number of steps that Washington can take to ward off future nuclear transfers.
To begin, the development of nuclear fuel guarantees could help to satisfy demand for nuclear fuel in new nuclear power states without generating a corresponding risk of nuclear proliferation.
For this reason, the development of a credible international fuel services system is of paramount importance. Accordingly, Stulberg's recommendations (this volume) should be read with great attention.
Contrary to the belief of many, tightening national export controls is only a small part of the overall solution. While export controls are an important policy tool, their utility rests on the assumption that proliferation is a problem that results from firms or bureaucracies exporting dual-use items without the knowledge or authorization of the central government. But, my analysis suggests that this is rarely a problem. The most important historical cases of sensitive nuclear transfer --those that have led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons --were the result of strategic decisions by national governments to help another country acquire sensitive nuclear facilities. When central governments make such a strategic decision, they can simply choose to override their own export control systems. Tightening export controls will not help address this problem.
What is needed, therefore, is an effort to alter the cost/benefits calculus of states that might be tempted to make the strategic decision to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology. There are a number of carrots and sticks that might be useful for such a purpose.
Among the carrots, the United States could seek to extend security guarantees to nuclear suppliers who are not yet under Washington's security umbrella. We have seen that countries that depend on the United States for their core security needs are less likely to export sensitive nuclear materials or technology. Therefore, Washington could, for example, encourage Serbia to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and could continue to expand and deepen its current strategic partnership with Pakistan. If these countries come to rely on Washington's protection, they will be more likely to think twice before conducting future sensitive nuclear transfers.
In some cases, however, carrots will fail to entice and Washington will need to reach for sticks. In these cases the United States should turn to threats in order to deter the international transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. A declaratory policy to hold responsible states that transfer sensitive nuclear material and technology, visibly strengthened nuclear forensics capabilities, and improved capabilities to interdict illicit nuclear shipments, should induce caution in potential nuclear suppliers. This portfolio of policies will help to ensure that, despite a widespread belief to the contrary, the nuclear renaissance will not allow many more countries to possess the world's most dangerous weapon.
